While Montaigne does not directly cite Machiavelli in this essay — he will do so in two later essays — this is his first piece to dip a toe into the type of military strategy discussion familiar to readers (and acolytes) of the Italian inventor of realpolitik.
Here, Montaigne offers an interesting critique to Machievelli’s amorality and pragmatism. Instead of challenging the morality of Machiavelli’s approach, as was common at the time, Montaigne argues that in some circumstances, it’s counterproductive to attain military victories by deception. His claim is that a foe often will not accept defeat unless it was attained via valorous means, than if a foe has any reason to believe its defeat was illegitimate, it will fight on.
While this doesn’t directly refute Machiavelli, and I wouldn’t be surprised to see him agree with Montaigne if presented with these arguments, Montaigne starts to get at a broader point here — that human nature is so variable, it is impossible to define a set of laws or behaviors that will hold up for most (never mind all) military and political situations.
This variability aligns with La Boetie’s broader critique of authoritarian power. If there is no way to train leaders to rule effectively in all situations, perhaps it is best to diffuse power and lessen the risks of the kinds of military adventurism that strong man rule inevitably engenders.
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